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Fair Trade-mark: Proposing an
Affirmative Duty on Licensors to
Enforce Their Corporate Social
Responsibility Codes
Dorothy L. Newman*
Modern consumers are increasingly interested in seeing the
brands they love commit to corporate social responsibility (CSR),
including fair labor practices and environmental sustainability
throughout their supply chains. Many corporations capitalize on
this demand through branding strategies that highlight their
commitment to CSR. Branding of CSR can include publishing
codes of conduct on corporate websites, incorporating a value of
doing good while doing well in print and video advertisements, or
even publicly partnering with nonprofit organizations. The
Lanham Act, the primary federal trademark statute in the United
States, articulates federal laws pertaining to branding and
advertising, and is rooted in a significant policy interest to keep
consumers informed and to prevent consumer deception. Two
doctrines of law that stem from the Lanham Act substantiate this
policy consideration: the naked licensing doctrine, which imposes
an affirmative duty on trademark licensors to supervise their
licensees’ quality control standards, and false advertising law,
which prevents corporations from espousing false or misleading
advertising in connection with their trademarks or brands. An
analysis of each of these bodies of law, along with the overall
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policy underpinnings of the Lanham Act, poses the concern that
corporations who incorporate CSR into their branding strategies
run the risk of deceiving consumers if in reality they do not
supervise their supply chain sufficiently to ensure the truth of their
public CSR statements. This Note analyzes the naked licensing
doctrine and false advertising laws, and proposes an affirmative
duty on corporations to monitor and enforce their CSR codes, in
compliance with the Lanham Act.
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INTRODUCTION
The average person in the United States is exposed to
somewhere between 4000 and 10,000 advertisements every day.1
Between food and beverages, entertainment and sports, toiletries
and home goods, and just about everything else, industries are
saturated with trademarks that catch the eye of the consumer at
every turn of their day. Even before stepping foot outside of the
house in the morning, a consumer is faced with trademarks on
toothpaste tubes and mouthwash bottles, cereal boxes and milk
cartons, clothing, jackets and shoes. When getting dressed in the
morning a consumer will make conscious decisions based on
trademarks: a die-hard fan might choose a t-shirt bearing her
favorite team’s trademark on gameday, a nostalgic college
graduate might choose a hoodie bearing his alma mater’s
trademark for a run in the park, and a fashion-conscious consumer
might choose an outfit bearing the trademarks of the most current,
sought after brands. When riding the subway, a consumer will
make subconscious associations with trademarks: both the banners
across the top of the car’s interior and the people sitting across the
car are covered with trademarks for food, apparel, service, and
entertainment brands.
Legally defined, a trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof— (1) used by a person . . . to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate
the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”2 Over
time, the role of trademarks has expanded. In 1916, the United
States Supreme Court held that the “primary and proper function”
of a trademark is to “identify the origin or ownership of the article
to which it is affixed.”3 However, this function has evolved in a
changing economy in which a trademark could indicate the source
of a product, even if the exact origin is unknown.4 Trademarks
1

Jon Simpson, Finding Brand Success in the Digital World, FORBES (Aug. 25, 2017,
8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesagencycouncil/2017/08/25/finding-brandsuccess-in-the-digital-world/#14048124626e [https://perma.cc/7Q9R-3KGX].
2
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
3
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916).
4
See Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1918).
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today serve essentially two functions: (1) “the prevention of
deception and consumer confusion,” and (2) “the protection of
property interests in trademarks.”5
While a company’s brand is inextricably linked to its
trademark, strong branding expands well beyond the mark, and
into the brand identity that the mark signifies to consumers.6
Multinational corporations apportion a substantial amount of
resources into their brand image,7 and consumers often associate
brands with identities similar to those of human beings.8 Branding
as a process of humanizing a corporation “shifts [consumer focus]
away from things like labor practices and supply chains and onto
issues of narrative and identity.”9 Nevertheless, many corporations
have woven their labor practices and social responsibility
initiatives into the fabric of their brand identities as part of their
humanization efforts when constructing a brand image. Further,
many multinational corporations have adopted written codes of
conduct to publicly declare a commitment to upholding fair labor
standards throughout their supply chains.10 However, enforcement
of these ambitious corporate social responsibility objectives has
proven difficult because the codes are not legally binding, and are
often monitored and regulated by the corporation that wrote them,

5

Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 1987).
Dan Pallotta, A Logo is Not a Brand, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 15, 2011),
https://hbr.org/2011/06/a-logo-is-not-a-brand [https://perma.cc/3CDA-RT7Y].
7
According to the CMO Report in 2016, marketing can account for up to nearly a
quarter of a corporation’s overall budget, particularly in the consumer packaged goods
industry. In the consumer services, tech software, and communications industries, the
percentages ranged from 13%–15%. See Marketing Budgets Vary By Industry, WALL ST.
J.: DELOITTE (Jan. 24, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://deloitte.wsj.com/cmo/2017/01/24/whohas-the-biggest-marketing-budgets/ [https://perma.cc/8THU-VK86].
8
Amanda Hess, What Happens When People and Companies Are Both Just
‘Brands’?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01
/magazine/what-happens-when-people-and-companies-are-both-just-brands.html
[https://perma.cc/CK3R-RRNT] (“Wendy’s, which used to be personified by a little redhaired girl or by its founder, Dave Thomas, is now personified by a social-media team
renowned for its ability to tweet like a rude teenager.”).
9
Id.
10
James J. Brudney, Envisioning Enforcement of Freedom of Association Standards in
Corporate Codes: A Journey for Sinbad or Sisyphus?, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 555,
555 (2012).
6
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despite conflicting interests to maximize profits and rise above
competition in the market.11
This Note focuses on the relationship between trademark law,
consumer protection, and corporate social responsibility code
enforcement. Part I provides an overview of the naked licensing
doctrine in trademark law, which imposes an affirmative duty on
trademark owners to supervise their licensees’ quality control
standards, along with some of the scholarly and judicial resistance
to the doctrine. Part II provides a brief history of corporate social
responsibility, and analyzes past and present monitoring and
enforcement practices along with some of the shortcomings of
these efforts. Finally, Part III proposes a new private action by
consumers as an additional mechanism for the enforcement of
corporate social responsibility codes by drawing an analogy from
the naked licensing doctrine and establishing an injury that
consumers incur when brands do not uphold the promises made in
their codes of conduct.
I. THE NAKED LICENSING DOCTRINE
A. Doctrine Overview
Before the 1946 enactment of the Lanham Act, the primary
trademark statute of the United States,12 the practice of licensing a
trademark, or allowing an entity other than the trademark owner to
bear the mark, constituted abandonment through which the
trademark owner risked losing the exclusive right to the mark.13
However, some courts found licensing to be valid so long as the
licensor kept some control with regard to the quality of the
products bearing its mark.14 The Lanham Act remained consistent
with this latter view that licensing in and of itself does not
constitute abandonment of a trademark, “but only if the licensor
exercises control over the nature and quality of the goods and/or
11

See id. at 556.
See generally Lanham Act (Lanham Trade-Mark Act) (Trademark Act of 1946),
Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified in scattered section of 15 U.S.C.).
13
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959).
14
Id. at 367.
12
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services sold by the licensee under the licensed mark.”15 Thus,
naked or unsupervised licensing can constitute an abandonment.16
The need for licensor control over licensees stems from the
purpose and function of trademarks. Since a trademark is intended
to serve as a source of information for consumers, the source of
information becomes compromised when licensees are free to use
licensed trademarks with no quality control from licensors.17 Such
a compromise poses a risk for consumer deception against which
the Lanham Act seeks to protect.18
There is no bright line rule that establishes a quality control
standard for licensors under the Lanham Act, but several circuit
courts have upheld some level of quality control.19 While the
majority of courts have established a middle ground approach,
some have fallen to either extreme with some decisions “extremely
lenient . . . adopt[ing] an almost ‘laissez faire’ approach,” and
other decisions “overly strict and too ready to strike down a mark
for inadequate control over a licensee.”20
In the Second Circuit’s decision in Dawn Donut v. Hart’s Food
Stores, Inc., the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant for
trademark infringement, and the defendant asserted that the
plaintiff’s trademark should be cancelled because the plaintiff
engaged in naked licensing by “fail[ing] to exercise the control
required by the Lanham Act over the nature and quality of the
goods sold by its licensees.”21 The Dawn Donut court confirmed
that the Lanham Act’s concept of trademark abandonment is the
origin of an affirmative duty on trademark licensors to supervise
their licensees22 and re-emphasized the public policy concerns of
consumer deception in its naked licensing analysis. The court
noted that if the licensor is “not compelled to take some reasonable
15

3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
18:38 (5th ed. 2019); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1055.
16
MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:48.
17
Id.
18
See generally Lanham Act.
19
MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:55.
20
Id.
21
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959).
22
Id.
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steps to prevent misuses of his trademark in the hands of others[,]
the public will be deprived of its most effective protection against
misleading uses of a trademark,” an effect that would run squarely
in opposition to the Lanham Act.23
In discussing the actual bar for naked licensing, Judge
Lumbard, who authored the Dawn Donut opinion emphasized the
need for evidence to prove a lack or existence of adequate
supervision in compliance with the Lanham Act.24 For example,
Judge Lumbard noted that the record from the district court did not
clarify whether the plaintiff conducted regular and comprehensive
inspections by qualified inspectors or whether it only sporadically
checked in on licensees with no specific objective.25 According to
Judge Lumbard, the latter would not suffice to satisfy the Lanham
Act’s requirements.26
The Fifth Circuit has taken a different approach than that of the
Second Circuit. While the Fifth Circuit held that failure to exercise
control would constitute an abandonment on the grounds that it is
deceptive to the public, it is explicit in stating that it “do[es] not sit
to assess the quality of products sold on the open market.”27 The
Fifth Circuit therefore held that a party seeking to establish a
forfeiture has a high burden of proving failure to supervise, and
“[r]etention of a trademark requires only minimal quality
control.”28
In contrast, while the Ninth Circuit has also held the
challenging party to a high standard of proof,29 it has found
instances of naked licensing by assessing supervising practices
23

Id. at 367.
Id. at 368.
25
Id. at 369.
26
Id.
27
Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th
Cir. 1977).
28
Id.; see also Am. Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 624–25 (5th Cir.
1963).
29
FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing
Barcamerica Int’l USA Tr. v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 2002);
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1982);
Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-E., 542 F.2d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir.
1976)).
24
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under a three-part test. The Ninth Circuit held in
FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, that The Freecycle
Network, an umbrella nonprofit organization that oversaw a
number of independent chapters, engaged in naked licensing
because it (1) did not retain express controls over licensees’ quality
control measures, (2) did not have actual controls over licensees’
quality control measures, and (3) was unreasonable in relying on
licensees’ quality control measures.30
The Ninth Circuit in Freecycle did not specifically decide on
an evidentiary standard because even when applying the higher
standard of proof and assessing the facts in the light most favorable
to the defendant, The Freecycle Network abandoned its trademark
through naked licensing.31 The Ninth Circuit therefore looked to
the three aforementioned factors to determine if naked licensing
had occurred.32
With regard to the first factor, the Ninth Circuit held that the
absence of a contractual right would support a finding of naked
licensing.33 Previously, some courts have held that if licensors hold
a contractual right to supervise licensees, it is enough to negate a
finding of naked licensing.34 However, according to the modern
understanding of the naked licensing doctrine, “such cases miss the
point that not only must there be a right to control, but that duty
must be discharged by the licensor.”35 Likewise, the second factor
becomes exceedingly probative to an inquiry into whether naked
licensing has occurred regardless of the presence of a contractual
right pursuant to the first factor.
For this reason, courts utilizing the Ninth Circuit factors will
look to the record to determine if actual supervision occurred,
30

Id. at 512.
Id. at 514–15.
32
The factors being, (1) whether the trademark owner had a contractual right to control
the mark, (2) whether the trademark owner actually controlled the nature and quality of
the use of its mark, and (3) whether the trademark owner reasonably relied on a licensee
to control the nature of the use of its mark. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:55.
33
FreecycleSunnyvale, 626 F.3d at 516.
34
Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Horst, 110 F. Supp. 678, 680 (D. Mass. 1953); see Wolfies
Rest., Inc. v. Lincoln Rest. Corp., 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 310, 1964 WL 8113, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 3, 1964).
35
MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:56.
31

2019]

FAIR TRADE-MARK

737

pursuant to the second factor.36 In Freecycle, the licensor asserted
that they exercised actual control over their licensees because they
had policies and etiquette for local chapters listed on their website,
among other similar reasons.37 The court held, however, that none
of these assertions constituted actual control because the Freecycle
Network’s controls were neither enforced nor effective.38
Finally, under the third prong, The Freecycle Network argued
in Freecycle that even in the absence of actual control, it
“justifiably relied on its member groups’ quality control
measures.”39 The Second Circuit has commented on a similar
argument of reliance, noting that it would be sufficient to negate a
finding of naked licensing only “where there is a history of
trouble-free manufacture and quality is not deficient, so as to
provide a just basis for reliance on the licensee’s own quality
control.”40 Additionally, however, the Ninth41 and Tenth Circuits42
have held that while reliance on licensees’ quality control efforts is
relevant, it is not enough to avoid a finding of naked licensing in
the absence of other forms of actual periodic inspection or
monitoring.
The Ninth Circuit also held that if the licensor and licensee
were involved in a “close working relationship,”43 the licensor
would be able to rely on the licensee’s own quality control efforts
and avoid a finding of naked licensing.44 An adequate relationship
could be established in the following four circumstances:
(1) a close working relationship for eight years; (2)
a licensor who manufactured ninety percent of the
components sold by a licensee and with whom it
36

MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:59.
FreecycleSunnyvale, 626 F.3d at 517.
38
Id. at 518.
39
Id.
40
MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:57; see also Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich
Pharmacal Co., 315 F. Supp. 45, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d on other grounds, 437 F.2d
566 (2d Cir. 1971).
41
See, e.g., Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1017–18
(9th Cir. 1985).
42
See, e.g., Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 872 (10th Cir. 1995).
43
Barcamerica Int’l USA Tr. v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 597 (9th Cir. 2002).
44
FreecycleSunnyvale, 626 F.3d at 518; MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:57.
37
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had a ten year association and knew of the
licensee’s expertise; (3) siblings who were former
business partners and enjoyed a seventeen-year
business relationship; and (4) a licensor with a close
working relationship with the licensee’s employees,
and the pertinent agreement provided that the
license would terminate if certain employees ceased
to be affiliated with the licensee.45
In addition, the Federal Circuit has adopted the preponderance
of evidence standard46 while several district courts have utilized a
clear and convincing evidence standard47 when inquiring into the
presence of naked licensing practices. Despite the lack of a brightline rule, it is generally held that the party challenging a trademark
has a high burden of proof when establishing that a licensor
engaged in naked licensing,48 and evidence of actual control—the
second of the Ninth Circuit’s three factors—is required from the
party whose trademark is being challenged.49
B. Shortcomings of the Naked Licensing Doctrine
The affirmative duty to supervise that the naked licensing
doctrine has imposed on licensors has been met with significant
scrutiny. Pushback to the naked licensing doctrine has surfaced for
several reasons, but three primary weaknesses in the doctrine are
especially relevant. Scholars have criticized the naked licensing
doctrine for (1) favoring unclean hands by serving only as a
defense to claims of trademark infringement, and not as its own
independent cause of action,50 (2) being inconsistent (and at times

45

FreecycleSunnyvale, 626 F.3d at 518 (citing Barcamerica Int’l, 289 F.3d at 597).
Cerveceria Centroamericana, S.A. v. Cerveceria India, Inc., 892 F.2d 1021, 1024
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
47
MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 17:12.
48
Id. § 18:48 (citing to courts that have held the challenging party to a clear and
convincing evidence standard, and courts that have found evidence of a delay in
supervision to be insufficient).
49
See, e.g., FreecycleSunnyvale, 626 F.3d at 512 n.1.
50
Rudolph J. Kuss, Comment, The Naked Licensing Doctrine Exposed: How Courts
Interpret the Lanham Act to Require Licensors to Police Their Licensees & Why This
Requirement Conflicts with Modern Licensing Realities & the Goals of Trademark Law,
9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 361, 373 (2005).
46
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seemingly unworkable) across varying business models utilized
across the spectrum of entities that own lucrative trademarks,51 and
(3) potentially hurting consumers with increased search costs
because when a court finds an instance of naked licensing, the
original owner loses the trademark, the infringer may continue
using it, and consumers are left having to “deal with infinite
deceptive users of a trademark instead of one.”52
The first two weaknesses in the naked licensing doctrine do not
negate the doctrine’s public policy purpose, which is to protect
against consumer deception. These two weaknesses may open a
discussion about a need for more flexibility in the standard, but
they do not point to a weakness or shortcoming of the consumer
protection policy entrenched within the naked licensing doctrine,
the Lanham Act, and trademark law at large. Further, the potential
harms of the third weakness must be balanced against the same
danger of potential harm to consumers that would be present if
there was no policing requirement. In the latter instance, the same
dangers of increased search costs and “infinite deceptive users,”
would be present but without the incentive to police that is built
into the naked licensing doctrine.
A closer analysis of each of the three main weaknesses of the
naked licensing doctrine will be useful in understanding why these
weaknesses do not negate the fundamental policy underpinnings of
the doctrine.
First, scholars have criticized the naked licensing doctrine for
favoring the unclean hands of a potential trademark infringer
because the current procedural mechanism of the doctrine allows it
to be asserted as a defense to an infringement claim, not an
independent cause of action.53 However, this criticism leaves room
for a proposed change to the doctrine that maintains the doctrine’s
policy objectives but shifts the power of litigation to another party.
Such an extension of the naked licensing doctrine from an

51

Kevin Parks, “Naked” Is Not A Four-Letter Word: Debunking the Myth of the
“Quality Control Requirement” in Trademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531, 536
(1992).
52
Kuss, supra note 50, at 373.
53
Id.
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affirmative defense to an independent cause of action seems to be
within reason, particularly when compared to other causes of
action that licensors can be subjected to for failing to complete
their duty to supervise licensees. For example, the “[f]ailure to
reasonably control a licensee may . . . render the licensor liable to
charges of false advertising if the licensee has used the trademark
as an instrument to defraud the public.”54 Additionally, the
affirmative duty to supervise licensees can extend to hold licensors
liable for the torts of licensees.55 While the tort liability of
licensors typically refers to personal injury or property damage
resulting from the licensed products,56 a combination of these
above mentioned theories and their underlying policy objectives
may give rise to a new procedural mechanism for the naked
licensing doctrine that involves an independent cause of action and
alleviates this criticism of the doctrine.
Second, scholars have criticized the naked licensing doctrine
for its inconsistency (and sometimes unworkability) across
business models.57 The Seventh Circuit noted in Eva’s Bridal Ltd.
v. Halanick Enterprises, Inc., “[h]ow much authority [from a
licensor over a licensee] is enough can’t be answered generally; the
nature of the business, and the customers’ expectations, both
matter.”58 This is because for certain business models, neither the

54

MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:48 (citing Waltham Watch Co. v. Fed. Trade
Comm’n, 318 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1963); Scotch Whiskey Ass’n v. Barton Distilling Co.,
338 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ill. 1971), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 489 F.2d 809 (7th Cir.
1973)).
55
MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:74 (citing Kennedy v. Guess, Inc., 806 N.E.2d 776,
786 (Ind. 2004) (“[T]rademark licensors have a duty under the Lanham Act to take
reasonable measures to detect and prevent misleading or deceptive uses of the
trademark . . . They are thus likely to take some ongoing role in the products bearing their
mark lest they risk loss of the right associated with ownership of it.”); Burkert v. Petrol
Plus of Naugatuck, Inc., 579 A.2d 26 (Conn. 1990) (the naked licensing case law does
not “suggest, in any way, that a trademark owner’s failure to exercise control subjects the
owner to affirmative liability in tort for damages caused by a defective product bearing its
trademark.”)).
56
Id.
57
Parks, supra note 51, at 536.
58
Eva’s Bridal Ltd. v. Halanick Enters., 639 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2011).
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nature of the business nor the expectations of the customers line up
with the current state of the naked licensing doctrine.59
In merchandising, for example, consumer expectations may not
be about an established link between the trademark and its source
but rather an established link between the trademark and a team or
character that the customer identifies with.60 Additionally, in these
instances, the nature of the business model does not lend itself to
the policing mechanism under the naked licensing doctrine which
expects the licensor to set a standard of product quality and then
supervise licensees to ensure that their licensed products have
conformed to that standard of quality.61 However, in
merchandising, thousands of t-shirt companies, whose shirts fall
onto a wide spectrum of quality and price, may be licensees of a
sports team logo or movie character.62 If courts require all of a
sports team’s licensees to have a regular quality standard, they
would have to determine which t-shirt should set the standard.63
However, the “quality of a [team] jersey cannot be measured
against standards established by the trademark owner because the
trademark owner’s product is entertainment. Therefore, a court
would have to use the licensee’s quality as a benchmark, and this
poses a problem when a trademark owner has hundreds or
thousands of licensees.”64
Like the first criticism of the naked licensing doctrine, this
second criticism of inconsistency or unworkability zooms in on a
need for a slightly more flexible standard of control, because
control that is sufficient to prevent consumer deception may look
different when an apparel brand like Nike licenses its trademark
than when an entertainment brand like The Walt Disney Company
does so.65

59

Kuss, supra note 50, at 376.
Id.
61
Id. at 377.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
“Control that is satisfactory for the license of a children’s television program
character on a plush doll toy will probably be much less than the extensive regulation
system needed for the license of a famous mark on a system of quick-service food
60
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Even if a more flexible standard is necessary to be workable in
certain contexts, some standard of control is imperative to ensure
that consumer expectations are met and consumers are not
deceived.66 While it is true that a sports team’s product is
entertainment, and therefore, the brand has not established a
quality standard for apparel to which licensees should conform, the
brand has still established a reputation and brand value. Thus, a
reasonable consumer would likely have the expectation that a piece
of apparel bearing the team’s trademark would be of a certain
quality that is consistent with the trademark’s overall value, as
opposed to a counterfeit which is assumed to be of lower quality.
A more flexible standard should accommodate the nuanced arena
of the industry, while both maintaining the policy underpinnings of
the doctrine and being realistic about consumer expectations of
licensed products.
Finally, scholars fear that the naked licensing doctrine runs the
risk of backfiring and hurting consumers with the burden of
increased search costs.67 However, as aforementioned, this danger
must be considered in conjunction with the danger that would be
caused if the entire control requirement was abolished. This final
criticism of the naked licensing doctrine poses the concern that the
doctrine can result in the very outcome it seeks to protect against.
But this is a tenuous argument; it suggests that if a standard is
imperfect, it can’t be good. However, the naked licensing doctrine
serves as an incentive to trademark holders to police their
licensees.68 While it is true that licensors that fail to adequately
police their licensees will lose their trademark and an indefinite
amount of entities would be able to then use the mark, the point is
moot because in that instance the mark at issue will no longer be a
registered trademark.69 The lack of a registered mark will be a
source of information to consumers to part with previous
associations they may have made with it. On the other hand, with
restaurants . . . [i]n general, the scope of quality control must be commensurate with the
scope of uses of the mark permitted in the license.” MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:55.
66
Id.
67
Kuss, supra note 50, at 373.
68
See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:48.
69
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012).
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no control requirement at all, there will be a registered trademark
that is being misused. The latter poses a greater danger of
consumer confusion and deception.
Consumer protection is a fundamental tenet of the Lanham Act
which specifically carves out the instances in which a trademark
registration can be cancelled for losing its significance as an
accurate source of information for consumers.70 At its heart, the
naked licensing doctrine is a consumer protection measure that is
consistent with this objective of the Lanham Act.71 The affirmative
duty to supervise the quality standards of licensees ensures that
consumers will not risk purchasing goods of a lesser quality than
the trademark denotes, and that consumers will not have to endure
burdensome search costs to make informed decisions about the
products they are buying.72 Despite a potential need for more
flexibility and/or an updated procedural mechanism, to uphold the
significant purpose of the Lanham Act, the naked licensing
doctrine’s underlying policy must be protected.
II. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. CSR Overview
Multinational corporations have been incorporating codes of
conduct into their business models to indicate their commitment to
workers’ rights since the 1970s.73 In 1996, Kathie Lee Gifford was
in tears on her show Live with Regis and Kathie Lee, coming to her
own defense after the National Labor Committee, an NGO now
known as the Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights,
announced that her clothing line, which was sold in Wal-Mart
stores, had used child labor and sweatshops.74 Crying on national
70

Id.
Daniel Klerman, Trademark Dilution, Search Costs, and Naked Licensing, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1759, 1767 (2006).
72
Id. at 1767–68.
73
Brudney, supra note 10, at 555.
74
James Epstein-Reeves, The Parents of CSR: Nike and Kathie Lee Gifford, FORBES:
CSR BLOG (June 8, 2010, 10:26 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2010/06/08/theparents-of-csr-nike-and-kathie-lee-gifford/#d889a6f416f5
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television, Gifford insisted that the accusations were not true.75 In
the same year, Life magazine published heart-wrenching photos of
children in Pakistan sewing soccer balls for Nike.76 Both scandals
essentially started the conversation about corporate social
responsibility as it is known today77: a written set of standards that
has become prevalent in multinational corporations across almost
every industry.78 While existence of these codes has become
ubiquitous, monitoring and enforcing corporate social
responsibility codes remains a pressing unanswered question.
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Codes vary amongst
corporations, but in 2012 about one quarter of them explicitly
referred to the International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions
that address Freedom of Association.79 For example, the “Nestlé
Corporate Business Principles” is an eighteen-page document
authored by the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman, and
addressed to all employees.80 Nestlé’s Principles invoke ten
distinct categories of business operations that will be regulated, of
which number four is “human rights and labour practices” in which
the United Nations Global Compact’s Guiding Principles on
Human Rights and Labour (UN Guiding Principles) are invoked.81
The UN Guiding Principles were promulgated in 2011 in an
effort to publish a UN-certified statement in support of the
enforcement of international labor rights through a “Protect,
Respect, and Remedy” framework in which States have a duty to
protect human rights, corporations have a responsibility to respect
human rights, and victims of violations have access to appropriate

75

Id.
Id.
77
Id.
78
See, e.g., The Nestlé Corporate Business Principles, NESTLÉ (June 2010),
http://www.nestle.com/asset-library/documents/library/documents/corporate_governance
/corporate-business-principles-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EMC2-7KML]
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Nestlé].
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Brudney, supra note 10, at 559.
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NESTLÉ, supra note 78, at 3.
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Id. at 2.
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remedies.82 The Guiding Principles are not legally binding: an
early page includes a disclaimer stating “[n]othing in this Guiding
Principles should be read as creating new international law
obligations, or as limiting or undermining any legal obligations a
State may have undertaken or be subject to under international law
with regard to human rights.”83 Rather, the Guiding Principles
provide a framework that allows interested States and corporations
to adhere to a set of standards endorsed by the UN when
implementing CSR efforts.84
Within the Guiding Principles, the language that addresses
States as opposed to the language that addresses corporations
differs substantially. States, for example, have a duty85 and
corporations have a responsibility.86 However, the responsibility of
corporations, as written, is not inconsequential. When addressing
the responsibility of corporations, the Guiding Principles reference
“at a minimum . . . those expressed in the International Bill of
Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set
out in the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.”87 Further, the
Guiding Principles are intended to apply to “all enterprises
regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership and
structure.”88
Finally, while legal enforceability is absent from the Guiding
Principles, the third pillar of the framework outlines the ways in
which States can ensure access to remedy for victims of labor
violations, recognizing that “[s]tates must take appropriate steps to
ensure, through judicial, administrative, legislative or other
appropriate means, that when such abuses occur within their

82
U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents
/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9DF-GNDC].
83
Id. at 1.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 4.
86
Id. at 13.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 15.
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territory and/or jurisdictions those affected have access to effective
remedy.”89
ILO Conventions 87, 138, and 182 are also explicitly
referenced in the Nestlé Corporate Business Principles.90
Convention 87 covers Freedom of Association (FOA) and the
Right to Organize, and has been ratified by 155 countries.91 The
United States is among the countries that have not ratified, along
with several other developed countries including New Zealand and
Singapore, as well as China and India.92 Convention 138 covers the
Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, and has been
ratified by 171 countries, of which the United States is not one.93
And Convention 182 addresses the Worst Forms of Child Labor,
and has been ratified by 182 countries including the United
States.94
B. Past and Present Self-Monitoring and Enforcement
Mechanisms
Some CSR codes explicitly mention their monitoring process.
Hasbro, for example, has a clause in its written code titled
“Monitoring and Right to Terminate,” in which it outlines its right
to terminate relationships with subcontractors and licensees after
conducting “periodic on-site visits of working and living
conditions, including unannounced audits of production records”
and requiring “implementation of an acceptable written corrective
action plan” that has not been adhered to.95 Others make no
mention of their monitoring or enforcement plans. The Nestlé
Corporate Business Principles do not make reference to monitoring

89

Id. at 27.
NESTLÉ, supra note 78, at 9.
91
Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17.
92
Id.
93
Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment,
June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297.
94
Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161.
95
Global Business Ethics Principles, HASBRO CORP. SOC. RESP., https://csr.hasbro.com
/en-us/csr/global-business-ethics-principles [https://perma.cc/KFA7-X5CC] (last visited
Mar. 11, 2019).
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or enforcement mechanisms; rather, the Principles utilize platitudes
such as “support,” “respect,” and “uphold.”96 Any forms of
monitoring or enforcing corporate codes that are in place, are for
the most part internal and self-regulated.97 Corporations have
created human rights or CSR divisions to conduct site visits and
interviews, review complaints, and recommend proper corrective
actions.98 However, this form of regulation can pose a number of
problems, particularly when dealing with a multinational
corporation that has an intricate net of global suppliers, licensees,
and contractors, with limited transparency as to the labor
conditions of those entities.99
Additionally, self-regulation in and of itself is a problematic
mode of enforcing a CSR code. At the outset, corporations face the
tension between their desire to uphold human rights principles and
their desire (and in some ways their fiduciary duty) to maximize
profits and obtain competitive advantages in the market.100 Further,
certain monitoring measures are not carried out in the most
effective manner. Worksite visits, for example, are often
announced ahead of time, giving the people in charge of the
factory under scrutiny notice to draw up a second set of books to
present auditors with, and to train employees with the script of
what they should say in their interviews.101
Corporations can get around their own internal conflicts of
interest (to maximize profits while upholding fair labor practices)
by engaging third party auditors such as workers’ rights nonprofit
organizations. For example, the Fair Labor Association (FLA) is
an international organization that brings together universities,
organizations, and corporations in a collective effort to protect
workers’ rights around the world.102 FLA’s methodology expands
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NESTLÉ, supra note 78, passim.
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Id. at 570.
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Id. at 571; Owen E. Herrnstadt, Voluntary Corporate Codes of Conduct: What’s
Missing?, 16 LAB. LAW. 349, 361 (2001).
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Brudney, supra note 10, at 570.
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/N7FB-GYP6] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
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beyond conventional audits in response to complaints, which tend
only to succeed in “protecting workers from the most egregious
violations of labor rights.”103 In contrast, FLA conducts regular
audits in an effort to prevent recurring violations and cultivate
sustainable change in workplaces around the world.104 FLA
compares its auditing work to that of an emergency room:
“Auditing is like seeking urgent care at an emergency room. The
doctor might ask your symptoms based on a checklist and
prescribe pills that will make the pain or fever go away. Three
weeks later, however, the same pain might return, and you’re right
back in the emergency room.”105 In this way, FLA views auditing
as an ongoing and iterative process of learning and understanding
the scope of a workplace environment rather than a snapshot on
one particular day.106
However, even external auditors have been criticized for not
being implemented effectively.107 This is because corporations
have used monitors without the requisite experience or knowledge
of labor standards.108 Furthermore, the actual audits may be
ineffective if they are conducted in a way that makes it unlikely for
a worker to trust the auditor.109
Third-party auditors have also come into conflict with the
various stakeholders involved in their operations. For example, the
Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) is another independent labor
rights monitoring organization that conducts in-depth workplace
visits and investigations.110 In 2017, just after the NCAA March
Madness tournament came to a close, Nike began blocking WRC’s

103

Our Methodology, FAIR LAB. ASS’N, http://www.fairlabor.org/our-methodology
[https://perma.cc/YAZ2-FQNP] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
104
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Id.
107
Herrnstadt, supra note 100, at 361.
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Id. at 360; Brudney, supra note 10, at 570.
110
WORKER RTS. CONSORTIUM, https://www.workersrights.org/ [https://perma.cc
/KE7W-99RM] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). The Worker Rights Consortium typically
audits only in response to “fire alarms,” or reports of misconduct. Id. This is distinct from
FLA’s regular audit methodology because WRC “puts out fires” whereas FLA prevents
them. Id.
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access to its suppliers’ factories.111 Despite over 150 organized
protests from the United Students Against Sweatshops, Nike
“would rather narrow the information it considers than keep an
open channel for workers’ rights.”112 This move was a dangerous
step backwards for Nike’s human rights efforts, cutting life-saving
communication lines for workers.113 The decision was also
surprising, because in the wake of the Rana Plaza factory collapse
that killed 1134 workers in Bangladesh in 2013, corporations have
been taking a better look at their supply chains.114 The increase in
supply chain monitoring occurred especially because reports from
survivors of the Bangladesh tragedy shed a light on workers’
voices being suppressed despite reports of begging not to work in
an obviously dangerous situation.115
The conversation didn’t end there, however. Universities,
perhaps the most influential stakeholders in the WRC’s efforts,
responded to Nike’s practices.116 Georgetown ended its contract
with Nike altogether, until announcing a new deal that was the
product of intense negotiations.117 The negotiations for
Georgetown’s new deal with Nike were led by mediation expert,
Don Edwards, who mediated between the three stakeholders,
Georgetown, Nike, and WRC.118 Among several demands, Nike
insisted that WRC keep findings from investigations confidential
while Nike was given an appropriate amount of time to
remediate.119 On the other hand, the deal required Nike to abide by
labor standards set by IMG College Licensing, a group involved in
111

Judy Gearhart, The Real March Madness: Nike Ditches University Commitments,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2017, 1:03 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/thereal-march-madness-nike-ditches-university-commitments_us
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managing university licensing agreements.120 While a number of
universities have had codes of conduct specifically for their
licensees, Nike found this to be untenable.121 With the new model,
IMG could put out a universal set of standards that all universities
could adopt.122 Experts feared that IMG might not be the right
body for this responsibility, but WRC has found the code to be
effective.123 Ultimately, this new deal can serve as a model for
other universities working through licensing agreements with
major brands that operate through subcontractors and suppliers all
over the world.124 In this way, Georgetown felt it was especially
important to negotiate a new deal rather than terminate a
relationship entirely, because the former tactic gave Georgetown
actual leverage to make some change.125
However, another major hurdle to self-enforcement or even
enforcement by independent third parties, is the intricate nature of
multinational corporations’ supply chains.126 First, multinational
corporations often work with a large number of subcontractors, and
constantly shift between suppliers.127 Corporations often state that
they do not even have the knowledge of where a large amount of
their products are manufactured as a product of this supply chain
model.128 Further, factories often employ workers on short-term
contracts called, in Cambodia, “fixed-duration contracts.”129
Studies of the shift to fixed-duration contracts have brought to light
120
Id. According to the Labor Code on IMG’s website, the organization requires
licensees to adopt standards that “meet or exceed those established by the institutions, the
FLA, and/or the WRC,” among several other requirements. See Labor Code, IMG C.
LICENSING, http://www.imgcollegelicensing.com/Resources/Labor-Code.aspx [https://
perma.cc/FC5U-ENV9] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
121
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129
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SEAMS: HOW WIDESPREAD USE OF FIXED-DURATION CONTRACTS THREATENS CAMBODIAN
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an increase in worker insecurity as well as a serious threat to
worker rights enforcement under both domestic and international
law.130
While it is hard to believe in this day and age, when
corporations are the most sophisticated that they have ever been in
terms of their access to knowledge and data, even corporations that
do have the knowledge of where and by whom their products are
being manufactured, have limited leverage over these suppliers.131
Often multinational corporations outsource work to hundreds or
thousands of facilities, and their work within those facilities may
only make up about 10% of the work done at that factory.132 With
that in mind, a corporation threatening to terminate a relationship
with a supplier may have compromised leverage over a supplier
that has strong relationships intact with the corporations that
comprise the other 90% of its output.133
C. Private Causes of Action as an Enforcement Tool
While the Federal Trade Commission has enforcement
authority against corporations that advertise falsely or deceptively,
there is no private right of action on behalf of consumers.134
Private causes of action can provide another method of enforcing
CSR codes.135 There are several options for private actions, and
while each comes with the drawbacks associated with litigation,
namely burden, cost, and risk, each also introduces a unique
avenue to judicial enforcement of CSR codes.136
An essential inquiry when assessing the validity of any private
cause of action is standing, because in order to successfully bring a
cause of action against a multinational corporation for failure to
enforce a corporate social responsibility code, the plaintiff would
130
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need to prove that she has been injured as a result of
noncompliance.137 To have standing to bring a lawsuit a party must
satisfy the three-part test established by the Supreme Court in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered
an injury in fact which is concrete and particularized and actual or
imminent, (2) there must be causation between the injury and the
action before the court, and (3) it must be likely that a favorable
decision by the court will redress the injury.138 Within this
framework, pinpointing a specific injury that is capable of being
redressed by a favorable decision is among the biggest hurdles to
the private cause of action method. With a finding of standing,
private causes of action have been considered on behalf of
employees and investors,139 as well as consumers. The false
advertising action brought on behalf of consumers is most relevant
to this Note.
In 2003, the Supreme Court dismissed the case, Nike, Inc. v.
Kasky, on jurisdictional grounds.140 However, the decision, which
was originally tried in a state court in California, can teach scholars
a lot about the potential viability of such a claim. The claim was
brought by consumers against Nike, stating that “communications
Nike made to customers, newspaper editors, college presidents and
athletic directors, and others responding to allegations that Nike
had engaged in, or was complicit in, the mistreatment of foreign
workers . . . contained significant misstatements of fact . . .
actionable under California’s unfair competition and false
advertising laws.”141 California’s unfair competition law provides,
137

See generally Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Id. at 560–61.
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in relevant part, that “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business
act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertising,” shall constitute unfair competition.142
Nike’s response to the allegations that their statements were
actionable under false advertising laws was that even if their
statements had been false, they were entirely protected under the
First Amendment because they were part of an ongoing debate
about the general conversation surrounding the labor practices of
multinational corporations.143 The California Supreme Court, in a
split decision, ultimately rejected Nike’s theory.144 The United
States Supreme Court agreed to review Nike’s First Amendment
claims, but ultimately dismissed the case, leaving Nike’s First
Amendment assertions unanswered.145
To assess the likelihood of success in a future private action on
false advertising grounds, an analysis and overview of the
commercial speech doctrine is necessary. Prior to a series of cases
culminating in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council Inc., the Supreme Court did not
consider commercial speech to be protected under the First
Amendment.146 Virginia Pharmacy involved a challenge to a law
that prohibited the advertisement of drug prices.147 The Court
presented three rationales for protecting commercial speech under
the constitution: (1) consumers have an interest in accessing the
information at issue, (2) commercial speech has the power to
ensure that consumers are all able to make informed purchase
decisions with all the relevant information, and (3) in general, the
free flow of commercial information can contribute to the public
interest in informed decision making.148 The Court’s reasoning
played into a theme that “commercial speech is valued because of

142
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its ability to communicate useful information to consumers and to
help them make more informed choices.”149 Importantly, under this
notion, “only truthful, nonmisleading speech is constitutionally
protected.”150
The Supreme Court refined Virginia Pharmacy in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York by devising a four part test for evaluating the
constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech: (1) whether
the speech concerns a lawful activity; if not, it may be suppressed
outright; (2) whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial; (3) whether the regulation directly advances the
asserted governmental interest; and (4) whether the regulation is
more extensive than necessary.151 This test has been the subject of
serious criticism, however, both for being overly broad and for
being supported by little more than policy.152
Criticism of the commercial speech doctrine has attacked both
its substance and its breadth.153 The substantive argument is that
the commercial speech doctrine gives the government too much
power to suppress commercial speech, and that the Court should be
far stricter in only upholding regulations that are narrowly tailored
to protect important government interests.154 However, less strict
review would be justified when the Court is handling speech that is
being regulated for its “misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales
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practices, or requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer
information.”155
The breadth arguments to the commercial speech
doctrine contend that there is often no meaningful
way to differentiate between commercial and
noncommercial speech . . . [and] the test the Court
has devised for determining whether speech is
commercial—namely, whether it proposes a
commercial transaction—is unworkable because
often the line between commercial speech on the
one hand and artistic, social, and political
expression on the other is at best indistinct and at
worst illusory.156
This argument is relevant to the murky waters of Nike v. Kasky, in
which Nike’s argument was rooted in the characterization of the
speech at issue, as political expression, and Kasky’s argument was
rooted in the characterization of that same speech as commercial
speech, aimed at consumers and other stakeholders.157 Rather than
arguing that false statements deserved constitutional protection,
Nike strategically contended that the speech was not commercial
speech.158 In this way, Nike was able to make an additional
argument that “because its speech concerned matters of public
importance, liability could be imposed only if the plaintiff could
surmount the New York Times159 public figure standard—that is,
prove that Nike’s statements were made with knowledge of falsity,
or with reckless disregard for truth or falsity.”160
The blurred lines between commercial and non-commercial
speech present another obstacle to successfully bringing a private
action on this theory, because it gives corporations a useful defense
to allegations. In Kasky, the speech at issue, regardless of an
arbitrary classification, impacted business transactions. For many
consumers, Nike’s labor practices carry weight in purchase
155
156
157
158
159
160
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decision making, as one of several factors including price, design,
etc.161 Despite this nexus between the speech at issue and purchase
decisions, Nike’s theory has a dangerously damaging effect on any
false advertising claim, because “under Nike’s theory, sellers could
make false claims about these characteristics but nonetheless
escape liability by characterizing their statements as ‘core’ speech
about matters of social and political importance.”162
However, despite these obstacles, viability for false advertising
claims can be found in case history regarding apparel and other
manufactured goods companies that printed “Made in the U.S.A.”
labels.163 Despite the fact that the country of origin of apparel
could be deemed a political issue, that speech has been regulated,
and the regulation upheld in instances where the label was
discovered to be misleading or entirely false.164 In Colgan v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., the court cites Kasky in noting that
false advertising laws can be extended not only to speech that is in
fact false but speech that “has a capacity, likelihood or tendency to
deceive or confuse the public.”165
III. PROPOSING A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION THAT COMBINES
NAKED LICENSING AND FALSE ADVERTISING PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY OBJECTIVES
In this section, this Note proposes a new cause of action on
behalf of consumers that rests on a theory combining some of the
legal and policy underpinnings of both naked licensing and false
advertising. Through this independent cause of action, consumers
will be able to file a lawsuit against a multinational corporation
asserting that they were injured when the corporation failed to
supervise its licensees’ labor practices and thereby did not ensure
compliance with the corporation’s labor standards. The plaintiff
consumers would request injunctive relief which would require the
defendant corporation to remedy their current CSR enforcement
161
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165

Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1066–67.
Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 36, 46 (Ct. App. 2006).
Id.
Id.
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practices, where the failure to do so adequately and promptly could
result in a loss of the corporation’s exclusive right to their
trademark.
While the proposed cause of action will not entirely solve the
gap in enforceability of CSR codes, the analogies drawn in this
section will still be relevant and will create another tool in the
toolkit of potential mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing CSR
in a way that avoids some of the shortcomings of past and present
methods. Several obstacles stand in the way of the proposed
theory’s viability. Four obstacles are most pressing: (1) procedure,
(2) standing, (3) resistance from corporations, and (4) extending
quality control to labor standard control.
A. Procedure
While the naked licensing doctrine’s current procedural
mechanism operates only as a defense to an infringement claim,166
the proposed theory requires two distinct differences: (1) the
plaintiff will be a consumer or class of consumers, rather than
another corporation, and (2) the action will be available as an
independent cause of action, rather than a defense.
Corporations would be unlikely to initiate a suit against another
corporation on this theory. Not only does it seem unlikely that a
corporation would take on the burdens, costs, and risks of litigation
for the sake of enforcing CSR, but also, even if the potential gain
to a corporation is a competitor losing the right to their trademark,
bringing this type of suit creates the potential risk that the plaintiff
corporation will be exposed for all of its labor practices and/or
violations.
Additionally, the theory would not be workable if it could only
be invoked by defendants to another suit. This procedural
mechanism would run into the same shortcomings of self-regulated
CSR codes. If corporations needed to sue suppliers or other
corporations first, knowing full well that they risk exposing
themselves to this newly available defense, the suits that trigger the
defense simply wouldn’t be initiated.
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Kuss, supra note 50, at 373.
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Therefore, for this theory to work procedurally, it is imperative
that the power is left in the hands of consumers, and that the suits
can be initiated in their own right, not simply as defenses.
The potential for an extension of naked licensing actions into
independent lawsuits is not unheard of in the current scheme of the
law. First, scholars and courts have resisted the application of the
naked licensing doctrine in its current form because of its
procedural mechanism and the way that it favors defendants with
unclean hands.167 Furthermore, the affirmative duty that the
Lanham Act imposes on licensors to supervise licensees has been
extended to licensor liability due to misleading or false advertising
of licensees as well as products’ liability of licensees.168 The
criticism to the procedure of the doctrine, taken in consideration of
the other extensions of the affirmative duty, would lend support to
a potential shift in the implementation of the doctrine that upholds
the underlying consumer protection policy while shifting the power
of litigation out of unclean hands and into the hands of injured
consumers themselves.
B. Standing
As aforementioned, three standards must be met for a party to
have standing: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact
which is concrete, and particularized, and actual or imminent, (2)
there must be causation between the injury and the action before
the court, and (3) it must be likely that a favorable decision by the
court will redress the injury.169
Pursuant to prong (1), to establish an injury in fact, courts will
need to look to false advertising law under the Lanham Act. The
statue states in relevant part:
Any person who . . . uses in commerce any word,
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which—
167
168
169
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2019]

FAIR TRADE-MARK

759

(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship,
or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person . . .
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged
by such act.170
Unfortunately, the current case law is grim as to courts finding
standing for consumers looking to bring suit under the statute.171
Rather, courts have found that the statute is reserved exclusively
“to protect the interests of a purely commercial class against the
unscrupulous conduct of other commercial entities.”172
However, a close interpretation of the statute seems to lend
itself to the potential for an action to be brought by a consumer,
even if courts have yet to interpret it that way thus far. The statute
provides further, “as used in this subsection, the term ‘any person’
includes any State, instrumentality of a State or employee of a
State or instrumentality acting in his or her official capacity.”173
However, even with that explanation it seems unusual that the
statute uses the word “person,” as opposed to “entity” or
“organization.”174 Particularly striking is the second mention of the
word “person,” as it is accompanied by “he or she.”175 The use of
both the words “he” and “she” seem to suggest that the “person”
mentioned in the second instance could be an individual, rather
than a legal entity which may only have been referred to as “it,”
“she” alone, or “he” alone. Given that a definition is provided in
170

Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
44 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 1 (1997) (citing Two Moms and a Toy, LLC v. Int’l
Playthings, LLC, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Colo. 2012) (holding plaintiff didn’t have
standing for a false advertising claim under the Lanham Act because it was not engaged
in the sale of toys or a competitor of the defendant); Kwaak v. Pfizer, Inc., 881 N.E.2d
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the statute, it will be a hard argument to make, but it is also worth
noting that the definition itself only uses the word “includes,”176
and not “includes only” or “shall be limited to.”
Under the proposed theory of this Note, since it is an extension
of false advertising and naked licensing, and rooted deeply in the
underlying policy, the injury in fact will be based on the language
of the Lanham Act with the assumption that there is room in the
act to interpret “person” as consumer or class of consumers.
Once injury in fact is established, the next challenge to
standing will be causation between the injury and the action before
the court. To establish causation, the class of consumers would
have to be a similarly situated class of individuals who made
purchases based on the notion that the company from which they
were purchasing had a code of conduct that they upheld with
regard to their international labor standards, not only within the
organization but within the web of their supply chain, including
licensees. The action before the court, under this theory, is the
failure of a company to control the labor standards of licensees and
suppliers to ensure compliance with the labor standards that the
company promulgates on its website and other public relations.
Causation between that action and the injury can be established if
consumers make purchase decisions based on the information that
they are given from the corporation about that corporation’s labor
standards.
For example, imagine Consumer A was a fan of the ABC
sports team. The ABC sports team incorporated their commitment
to “social responsibility” in much of their advertising. Their code
of conduct could be found on their website, and their players often
posted pictures on social media that related to their team’s
commitment to human rights. This commitment, in fact, is a main
reason that Consumer A is an ABC fan. Likewise, Consumer A
invests a lot of time and energy into his fandom, and even invests
money by purchasing merchandise that bears the ABC logo. The
purchases make Consumer A feel a strong sense of purpose and
identity, as the ABC brand identity aligns closely with his own.

176

Id.

2019]

FAIR TRADE-MARK

761

Later, a feature in the local paper exposes a scandal that many of
the licensees that ABC uses for its merchandising engage in
practices that are in direct opposition to what is reflected in ABC’s
codes of conduct. Consumer A files a lawsuit under the theory
proposed in this Note, as the injury was caused by ABC’s failure to
supervise its licensees’ labor standards. The failure to supervise
was a direct cause of the false advertising, which in turn, was a
direct cause of Consumer A’s injury.
Finally, even after causation is established, a plaintiff must
establish that it is likely that a favorable decision by the court will
redress the injury. Under the framework of the above example,
injunctive relief would redress the injury, as an affirmative duty to
actively supervise the licensees’ labor practices would end the
false advertising. Further, if supervision does not ensue and the
corporation loses its trademark, the injury will also be redressed.
Without a trademark, the consumer will no longer build
associations with the brand, as the loss of the trademark is a source
of information, much like the presence of one is meant to be. If a
registered trademark denotes a certain shared identity across all
products that incorporate that mark, the lack thereof denotes that
that consistent identity should not be expected.
C. Resistance from Corporations
This theory will undoubtedly be met with substantial scrutiny
from multinational corporations, as the naked licensing doctrine in
its current state has already been regarded as too inflexible and in
turn too burdensome on corporations. Among several arguments,
corporations will likely assert that the theory imposes a burden that
is impossible to overcome given the intricate nature of the supply
chain for multinational corporations.
However, the duty imposed under this theory will mimic that
of the naked licensing doctrine as it currently exists. That is, under
this theory a corporation will have the affirmative duty to supervise
labor standards, only as far into the supply chain as they are
required to supervise with regard to quality. In this way, a
corporation may be hesitant to suggest in court that the affirmative
duty poses an undue burden, as they may be exposing a failure to
comply with an already existing affirmative duty to supervise
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quality. While this limitation to the new proposed duty will leave a
gap in enforcement, it will create a higher likelihood of compliance
than if the burden was unduly high and impracticable.
Additionally, to alleviate some of the pushback, the injunctive
relief requested under the theory will need to be accompanied with
some guidance for corporations who either have no supervision
mechanism in place, or whose mechanism is inadequate. The
guidance can include coordinating with an existing organization
like the FLA, to implement a regiment of regular audits.
D. Extending Quality Control to Labor Standard Control
The last major challenge that the theory proposed in this Note
will face is convincing courts to extend the naked licensing
doctrine’s affirmative duty to supervise licensees for quality
control to an affirmative duty to supervise licensees for labor
practices. This extension is imperative because the proposed theory
only works if it results in an affirmative duty on licensors to
supervise their licensees for labor standards.
First, it will be probative to point to actual practices of
corporations that strongly support a finding that corporations
themselves are aware that their consumers associate the brands
with the contents of their CSR codes. Some corporations have
written codes that, as extensions to their CSR codes, incorporate
their licensees as bound by the codes.177 Some corporations even
reserve themselves a right to monitor practices and terminate
business relationships that do not meet their standards.178 Further,
177
See, e.g., Licensee and Supplier Code of Conduct, NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N (Oct.
30, 2017, 8:52 AM), http://www.nba.com/nbap-code-of-conduct [https://perma.cc/67LFUP2N] (“In keeping with this mission, NBA Properties, Inc. (“NBAP”) is committed to
conducting its business in a socially responsible and ethical manner. We expect all NBAP
licensees, including their contractors, engaged in the manufacture and sourcing of
products bearing NBA, WNBA, NBDL and USA Basketball (collectively “Product
Suppliers”) to share this commitment. At a minimum, all Product Suppliers must adhere
to the following Licensee and Supplier Code of Conduct . . . .”).
178
See Global Business Ethics Principles, supra note 95 (“Monitoring and Right to
Terminate - Hasbro shall have the right to conduct periodic on-site visits of working and
living conditions, including unannounced audits of production records and practices and
of wage, hour and payroll information maintained by Facilities, to review and ensure
compliance with the Principles. Hasbro retains the right, in its sole discretion, to
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some codes make specific reference to their aim towards
consumers; Hasbro, for example, notes in its code that it “wants its
consumers to have confidence that products manufactured by
Hasbro, or its vendors, suppliers and licensees, are produced in
accordance with the principles set forth herein and are not made
under inhumane or exploitative conditions.”179
This language supports the finding that Hasbro is aware that
their consumers rely, at least in part, on the information in the
code, which they use to be confident of the types of labor practices
that can be assumed to occur when purchasing a product bearing a
Hasbro trademark (whether directly from Hasbro, or from a
licensee). This provides us with the information that the risk for
consumer deception is implicated when a CSR code is not
complied with, and would support a finding that a licensed product
bearing a trademark that had associated with it fair labor practices
could run the risk of being “nakedly licensed” if the licensees’
labor practices were not monitored and supervised, in compliance
with a written code or otherwise.
Additionally, when looked at through the lens of the Ninth
Circuit’s factors for what constitutes naked licensing, the
contractual obligation, or the words of the code of conduct, cannot
alone be enough to absolve a company of liability under this new
theory. To satisfy the affirmative duty to supervise, in addition to a
contractual obligation, actual supervision must take place.180
Remembering that the naked licensing doctrine is rooted in
consumer protection, an extension of the affirmative duty in a way
that further protects consumers seems natural. As mentioned, the
affirmative duty stems from the concept that consumers use
trademarks as a source of information. Consumers relate
trademarks to brands, which can be extensive identities almost like
terminate its relationship with a vendor, supplier or licensee facility in violation of the
Principles; however, Hasbro will endeavor to work with Facilities to promptly address
any problems discovered in the course of its review or audit. Hasbro will require the
implementation of an acceptable written corrective action plan for any problems found
during an audit. Failure to address items in the corrective action plan may result in
termination of the business relationship.”).
179
Id.
180
See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:56.
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those of humans.181 The connections that consumers draw to their
chosen brands is strong, and the full brand identity is associated
with a company’s registered trademark. It is a reasonable leap to
find that just as a consumer will associate a trademark with a
certain quality, a consumer will also associate a trademark with
certain human rights standards that that trademark has established
itself to encompass. If companies can license their trademark, and
with it their brand, without retaining or exercising any control over
their licensees to ensure that all the elements of their brand identity
are being upheld, then the risk of consumer deception will be high.
Finally, for the proposed theory to be viable, it is imperative
that an affirmative duty works in conjunction with the false
advertising component of the theory. One of Nike’s major defenses
in Kasky was that even if the statements they made regarding their
labor practices were actionable, the plaintiffs would be held to the
New York Times Co v. Sullivan standard, in which case they would
need to “prove that Nike’s statements were made with knowledge
of falsity, or with reckless disregard for truth or falsity.”182 While
this standard would introduce an insurmountable burden on the
plaintiff consumers in a pure false advertising action, it might not
be insurmountable if Nike’s affirmative duty to monitor and
supervise its licensees under the naked licensing doctrine was
invoked. If a court found that there was in fact an affirmative duty
to monitor, then proving at the very least “reckless disregard for
truth or falsity” would be substantially more plausible, because the
burden would then shift back to Nike to present the evidence
pertaining to their monitoring practices. If Nike was unable to do
that, they would be admitting not only to a failure to supervise, but
also to a reckless disregard to the falsity of their statements that
would satisfy even the high burden of New York Times. It is
therefore an essential feature of the theory that it is built on the
policy behind the Lanham Act, and it allows both the naked
licensing doctrine and false advertising laws to work together.
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CONCLUSION
Brands are powerful and multinational corporations own
exceedingly lucrative trademarks that signify all of the associations
consumers make with their brands. For many multinational
corporations, a commitment to fair labor standards throughout the
supply chain is a core feature of their brand’s image. In turn,
consumers rely on the information they are given from
multinational corporations when creating brand images and
making purchase decisions. If corporations use their commitment
to fair labor as a facet of their branding strategy, then they must be
held accountable to ensure that what they espouse is true, in order
to uphold the consumer protection policy behind the Lanham Act.
With the proposed cause of action, consumers will be able to
differentiate between the genuinely socially responsible brands and
those providing misleading or incomplete information on their
labor practices, amongst the thousands of brands they are
confronted with daily.

